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This article undertakes a critical examination of Kwame Gyekye’s main arguments 
for moderate communitarianism. Contrary to the general belief among African 
scholars, it contends that Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism, as he presents it in 
Tradition and Modernity (1997), is not as moderate as he believes it to be. The article 
also seeks to show that the gap which Gyekye claims exists between moderate or 
restricted and unrestricted communitarianism is not as wide as he suggests. 
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Introduction 
Professor Kwame Gyekye is a distinguished African intellectual who has made 
significant contributions to core issues in African and Western political philosophy. In 
his major book, Tradition and Modernity (1997), Gyekye presents arguments for his 
version of moderate communitarianism. 




This article argues that the distinction between unrestricted and restricted 
communitarianism, as presented in Chapter Two of Gyekye’s Tradition and 
Modernity (1997), does not make Gyekye less of an unrestricted communitarian. This 
is because his moderate communitarianism implies, like the unrestricted 
communitarianism he rejects, the communitarian primacy thesis. 
 
The article is divided into three main sections. The first presents the tenets of 
unrestricted communitarianism. In the second section, Gyekye’s formulation of 
moderate (restricted) communitarianism is outlined. The third section attempts to give 
an answer to the main question of the paper - “How moderate is Professor Gyekye’s 
Moderate Communitarianism?” The article concludes that Gyekye’s arguments 




Communitarianism as a political philosophy has at least two models: the family and 
the moderate models. The family model communitarianism or what Gyekye describes 
as “unrestricted communitarianism”, insists on (i) the moral supremacy of the 
community over the individual, (ii) the superfluity of rights in a community regulated 
by love and shared values, and (iii) the communal constitution of the individual 
(Gyekye 1997, 36-37 ; Etzioni 1998, p.x). With regard to (i), the implication is that in 
the case of a moral clash between the community and the individual, the community 
ought to be favoured. For unrestricted communitarianism, communal relationships are 
akin to the relationships in a typical nuclear family. All things being equal, just as a 
typical nuclear family is regulated by love, a human community ought to be regulated 
by it because love, not justice, is the first virtue of social institutions (Gyekye 1997, 
66; 2003, 36). 
 
According to Gyekye, for unrestricted communitarians such as Jomo Kenyatta, John 
Mbiti and Ifeanyi Menkiti, the individual is wholly moulded by his/her immediate 
community (Gyekye 1997, 36-37). This implies that just as a parent nurtures a child, 
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the individuals’ worldview is defined by the community that nurtures him/her right 
from birth. 
 
The primacy thesis is the bone of contention between communitarians and their rivals 
such as Liberals and libertarians (Sandel 1983, 1; 1992, 13; Taylor 1992, 32; Etzioni 
2004, 1). The communitarian version of the primacy thesis emphasizes the moral 
supremacy of the community over the individual (Gyekye 2003, 35). On the other 
hand, the liberal or libertarian primacy thesis emphasizes the moral supremacy of the 
rights of the individual (Rawls 1995, 3). According to Rawls, “each person possesses 
an inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot 
override … the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to 
the calculus of social interests”(Rawls 1995, 3-4). 
 
Gyekye’s Moderate Communitarianism 
The goal of moderate communitarianism is the reconciliation of rights and social 
responsibilities, that is, the balancing of social forces and individual autonomy 
(Etzioni 1998, p.x).  However, is Professor Gyekye a moderate communitarian, or 
simply a communitarian? The question seems to be uncalled for. Ordinarily, a small 
or big stone is a stone. So it would be absurd to ask whether or not a big or small 
stone is a stone. Similarly, it seems strange to ask if a moderate communitarian is a 
communitarian. Gyekye has a contrary view: for him, a moderate communitarian is 
not necessarily a communitarian. He distinguishes between moderate (restricted) and 
non-moderate (unrestricted) communitarianism. He asserts that while moderate 
communitarianism morally supports the need to balance individual rights and social 
responsibilities, unrestricted communitarianism argues for the moral supremacy of the 
community (Gyekye 1997, 52). 
 
Gyekye rejects the unrestricted communitarian view on the ground that the individual 
is only partly, not wholly, defined by the community (Gyekye 1997, 53). According 
to him, moderate communitarianism aims to ascribe to both the community and the 
individual an equal moral standing (Gyekye 1997, 41). In Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, “virtue” is the disposition to always strike the mean between two incompatible 
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extremes, i.e. excess (too much) and deficiency (too little) (Aristotle 1989, 352). 
Similarly, moderate communitarianism aims at balancing individual rights and social 
responsibilities. Moderate communitarians like Gyekye and Etzioni are optimistic that 
individual rights and social responsibilities are reconcilable (Gyekye 1997, 41; 
Etzioni 1998, p.x). The reconciliatory attempt is well developed by members of The 
Responsive Community led by Amitai Etzioni. Incidentally, Gyekye is a strong 
member of the editorial board of the group (Etzioni 1998, p.xx). 
 
However, while other versions of moderate communitarianism are motivated by the 
need to prevent the over-celebration of rights, Gyekye’s is motivated by the need to 
prevent the over-celebration of the community. According to Gyekye, the need to 
refrain from over-celebrating the community becomes necessary because various 
communal values and beliefs require, at times, critical evaluation and revision in order 
to encourage the overall development of the community (Gyekye 1997, 58). Thus the 
salient feature of Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is the recognition of the 
rights of the individual. Unlike Etzioni’s moderate communitarianism, it does not 
really attempt the balancing of rights and responsibilities. According to Gyekye, the 
recognition of rights is necessary because no society is absolutely communal or 
absolutely individualistic (Gyekye 1997, 41). In Gyekye’s view, moderate 
communitarianism will not oppose the doctrine of individual rights for the reason that 
the individual and the community, while closely interacting, must maintain their 
unique spheres. 
 
According to Gyekye, rights are so important that “at both theoretical and practical 
level, communitarianism cannot set its face against individual rights” (Gyekye 1997, 
64). For him, rights form part of the intellectual activity of a self-assertive 
autonomous individual. It is inevitable for moderate communitarianism to recognize 
“the intrinsic worth and dignity of the individual person” (Gyekye 1997, 40). The 
individual is both social and autonomous: 
The capacity for self-assertion that the individual can exercise 
presupposes, and in fact derives from, the autonomous nature of the 
person. By autonomy, I do not mean self-completeness but the having 
of a will, a rational will of one’s own, that enables one to determine at 
least some of one’s own goals and to pursue them, and to control one’s 
destiny (Gyekye 1997, 54). 
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On the autonomy of the individual, Gyekye further contends: 
In the light of the autonomous (or near autonomous) character of its 
activities, the communitarian self cannot be held as a cramped or 
shackled self, responding robotically to the ways and demands of the 
communal structure. The structure is never to be conceived as reducing 
a person to intellectual or rational inactivity, servility and docility 
(Gyekye 1997, 55-56). 
 
However, Gyekye’s attempt at ascribing equal worth to both individual rights and 
social responsibility is unsuccessful because he places more value on the community 
than on the individual. His moderate communitarianism subscribes to the traditional 
communitarian primacy thesis, which asserts the moral supremacy of the community 
over the individual (Gyekye 1997, 66). What is more, though Gyekye recognizes the 
rights of the individual, he never considers them to be the primary social value. 
Instead, the good of the community takes precedence over that of the individual. As a 
matter of fact, the recognition of individual rights under Gyekye’s moderate 
communitarianism is for the sake of the community, not that of the individual.  The 
individual’s capacity for evaluating many of the practices of his/her community 
deserves recognition because it serves the overall community interest (Gyekye 1997, 
57, 62-63). 
 
Thus  although Gyekye argues for the partial constitution of the individual by social 
relationships, he, like unrestricted communitarians, accepts the communitarian 
primacy thesis - the moral supremacy of the community over the individual (Gyekye 
1997, 71). This blurs his distinction between restricted (moderate) and unrestricted 
communitarianism. Thus unknown to Gyekye, most of his arguments in support of 
moderate communitarianism reinforce the unrestricted communitarianism which he 
rejects. In other words, Gyekye’s communitarianism is not moderate because like 
unrestricted communitarianism, it is based on the parent-child model. Therefore while 
ordinarily moderate communitarianism emphasizes the need to balance individual 
rights and social responsibilities, Gyekye’s communitarianism emphasizes the 
supremacy of the community over the individual. 
 
What does Gyekye’s recognition of rights amount to? The problem is partly 
conceptual. The word “recognition” is open to various interpretations. Does Gyekye’s 
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recognition of rights really make him a moderate communitarian? According to the 
Cambridge International Dictionary of English, “Recognition” partly means 
“acceptance”. The word “accepted” can replace the word “recognized” in the sentence 
“Michael Jackson was a recognized authority in Pop Music”. However, no 
communitarian accepts individual rights as the ultimate value. 
 
Alternatively, “recognition” can mean “being able to identify something or 
somebody”.  If I identify a Korean in a group of Kenyans, then a form of recognition 
has taken place. However, the identification of the said Korean among the Kenyans 
has insignificant moral weight if he/she is not treated in any special way. The 
recognition of the Korean reaches another level if, after he/she has been identified, 
he/she is specially honoured. 
 
A more sophisticated meaning of the word “recognition” is part of Russell Hanson’s 
interpretation of the word “seeing”. According to Hanson, “seeing is experiential. A 
retinal reaction is only a physical state – a photochemical excitation” (Hanson 1972, 
6). Someone may have visual contact with a particular object but still be unable to 
recognize it. For instance, if a non-physicist is ushered into a standard physics 
laboratory, he/she may have visual contact with certain pieces of equipment, but be 
unable to identify them as conical flask, bunsen burner, bell jar, test tube and 
microscope. Even if the non-physicist is presented with the list of names for all the 
equipment in the lab, he/she may still not be completely free from ignorance about the 
usefulness of each piece of equipment. Another level of recognition is achieved if the 
non-physicist is well informed about the utility of the equipment. The key point is that 
the visual contact with the external objects is not a sufficient condition for 
recognizing them. I may be able to identify a golden pen placed on the table: I may 
even know that it is used to write, without knowing that it is the most durable of all 
pens. Now, what is the point? As hinted above, Gyekye’s recognition of rights offers 
a weak support for moderate communitarianism. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the general moderate communitarian attempt to balance 
rights and responsibilities is not always practicable. This is due to the fact that there 
are instances when rights and responsibilities are in conflict. For example, the 
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exercise of political rights does not always serve the common good. Thus the right to 
vote does not compel voters to pick the best candidate. As such, a voter’s personal 
judgment may run contrary to the general community good. Similarly, the right to free 
choice of religion is normally considered to be more important than the good of the 
community, although the communal good might be enhanced if each individual was 
persuaded or compel to embrace a single, communal religion (Rachels 1996, 364). It 
is therefore clear that the reconciliatory approach with regard to individual rights and 
social responsibilities is not always successful. If this is granted, the debates between 
communitarians and their rivals such as liberals and libertarians regarding the primacy 
thesis continue. 
 
Thus though Gyekye seems to have been attempting to narrow the gap between 
communitarianism and its traditional rivals (chiefly liberalism and libertarianism), his 
attempt is unsuccessful. His defense of moderate communitarianism ends up being a 
defense of the unrestricted communitarianism which he intends to reject. Gyekye’s 
acceptance and defense of the primacy thesis makes him (though unknown to him) 
not only an unrestricted but also an unrepentant communitarian. 
 
Gyekye’s Communitarian Primacy Thesis: Restricted or 
Unrestricted? 
Gyekye’s estimation of individual rights in his version of moderate communitarianism 
is demonstrated in his support for the communitarian primacy thesis. Gyekye rejects 
what he claims to be the unrestricted communitarianism of Michael Sandel, Charles 
Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre. According to Gyekye, these communitarians are of 
the view that “the politics of rights should be given up and replaced with the politics 
of the common good” (Gyekye 1997, 62). However, Gyekye’s claim that these 
communitarians do not recognize rights is misleading. As a matter of fact, the western 
philosophers mentioned by Gyekye do recognize individual rights almost in the same 
way that he does. 
 
Sandel’s critique of liberalism does not amount to the rejection of rights, but only 
advocates the limit of rights (Sandel 1983). Sandel accepts, just like Gyekye, the 
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communitarian primacy thesis. Furthermore, the unrestricted communitarianism of 
Charles Taylor, like the moderate communitarianism of Gyekye, recognizes the 
individual’s capacity for autonomy. However, the extra point which Taylor makes, 
and which I think Gyekye would accept, is that such a capacity can only flourish in a 
human community (Taylor 1992, 33). Moreover, the individual’s right to community 
membership is well developed in Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice (1983). For 
him, membership of the community is the primary social good shared among 
members. Membership, for natural members, is a right. Those who are born into the 
community by parents who are also members have a right to membership. So, 
Walzer’s communitarianism is compatible with rights. Thus contrary to Gyekye’s 
position, the unrestricted communitarianism of Sandel, Taylor and Walzer recognizes 
rights. 
 
Gyekye states that rights are not to be asserted or insisted on with “belligerency, for 
communal values such as generosity, compassion, reciprocities and mutual 
sympathies” are far more important than rights. Moderate communitarianism “cannot 
be expected to be obsessed with rights” (Gyekye 1997, 65). The communitarian 
society, perhaps like any other type of human society, deeply (uncompromisingly) 
cherishes the social value of peace, harmony, stability, solidarity and mutual 
reciprocities and sympathies. In the case of a moral clash between the rights of the 
individual and these communal values, the communal values ought to take precedence 
over the rights of the individual. Gyekye’s primacy thesis is, like that of Sandel (1983, 
1) and Taylor (1992), supported by the social nature of the individual. The 
individual’s relational character defined by his/her natural sociality “immediately 
makes her naturally oriented to other persons with whom he or she must live” 
(Gyekye 1997, 67). This is in perfect agreement with Sandel’s idea of limiting rights 
and Taylor’s view that rights can only flourish in the community. Gyekye further 
contends that in the event of any anti-social activities by an individual, the community 
will have to take the steps necessary to maintain its integrity and stability (Gyekye 
1997, 65). It is noteworthy that he never states the limit of the steps the community 
could justifiably take against recalcitrant members. 
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According to Gyekye, The individual ought to develop a caring attitude with respect 
to the well-being of others. This entails the obligation to show concern for the welfare 
of others, and commitment to refrain from harming others. The responsibilities to 
fellow community members are not the product of any form of contract, but are rather 
derived from human social nature which, according to Gyekye, “implicates the 
individual in a web of moral obligations, commitments and responsibilities” for the 
sake of the common good (Gyekye 1997, 71). 
 
There is therefore no difference between the unrestricted communitarianism rejected 
by Gyekye and the moderate communitarianism he defends. As earlier noted, 
Gyekye’s recognition of rights (irrespective of the degree) is not for the sake of the 
individual but for the sake of the community. The individual is valued basically 
because he/she is valuable to the community. Thus Gyekye treats the individual, 
contrary to Immanuel Kant’s admonition, not as an end but as a means. This is further 
evident when Gyekye writes: 
At the practical level, communitarianism would realize that allowing 
free rein for the exercise of individual rights, which obviously includes 
the exercise of the unique qualities, talents and dispositions of the 
individual, will enhance the cultural development and success of the 
community ... Though rights belong primarily to the individuals, 
insofar as their exercise will often directly or indirectly, be valuable to 
the larger society, they ought to be recognized by the communitarian 
theory (Gyekye 1997, 64). 
Gyekye’s words above articulate an undiluted unrestricted communitarianism. The 
goal of Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism is still the moral protection of the 
community. Both moderate and unrestricted communitarianism celebrate the 
community, not the individual. 
 
From the foregoing observations, it is clear that the gap between the moderate 
communitarianism which Gyekye defends and the unrestricted communitarianism 
which he rejects is not as wide as he believes it to be. However, I am not arguing that 
moderate and unrestricted communitarianism are the same. Rather, the point is that 
the distinction between them, as presented by Gyekye, is not clear. 
 
It is also important to briefly respond to Gyekye’s view of the moral status of the 
individual. Though Gyekye maintains that the individual is only partially constituted 
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by the community, the relationship between the individual and the community, as he 
presents it, is still based on the parent-child model. The community nurtures the 
individual just as the parent nurtures the child. Further, relationships among members 
of the community ought to be regulated by love and shared values just as is the case in 
a nuclear family (Gyekye 1997, 66). In other words, the natural bond among members 
of a community gives rise to the need to fulfill certain responsibilities towards the 
community. 
 
However, Gyekye’s attempt to base the relationship between the individual and the 
community on the parent-child model is unsuccessful. According to Immanuel Kant, 
the rightness or wrongness of an action is independent of its consequences. For Kant, 
duty is for the sake of duty (Kant 1989, 253-287).  If it is the parents’ duty to mind the 
child, the child’s responsibilities towards the parents, later in life, could not be equally 
justifiably supported by the original duty (the minding of the child). The minding of 
the child is not optional but a duty incumbent on the parents. The duty ought to be 
performed even if it would yield no dividends in the future. 
 
Similarly, the communitarian argument that the community nurtures (either partly or 
wholly) the individual and provides the structure that makes the flourishing of the 
individual possible offers a weak justification for the individual’s responsibility 
towards the community later in life (Taylor 1992, 36). Nevertheless, I am not 
suggesting that the child ought not to mind his/her parents, or that the individual 
ought not to fulfill his/her obligations towards the community. My point is that the 
responsibilities in either case could not be plausibly justified by the initial 
responsibilities performed by either the parents (in the case of the child) or the 
community (in the case of the individual). The main reason the parents ought to mind 
the child is because the latter is vulnerable before he/she reaches a certain age. Any 
attempt to treat the parents’ responsibilities towards the child as investments which 
ought to yield some economic or non-economic dividends later in life degrades the 
initial duty. Furthermore, the legitimate reason why the child (now an adult) ought to 
mind his/her aged parents is because they are equally vulnerable and weak, not 
because they minded him/her as a child. Ordinarily, those who support the needy do 
so not because those needy nurtured them as little children. 




Though Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism aims at the recognition of rights, it 
stresses the primacy of love over justice, contending that  love (not justice) is the first 
virtue of social institutions (Gyekye 1997, 72). The emphasis on love should be 
expected. Communitarianism in general emphasizes the social values of friendship 
among members of a community. However, Gyekye’s insistence on the primacy of 
love undermines his moderate communitarianism. No rival theory to 
communitarianism (moderate or non-moderate) advocates any form of hatred. Neither 
liberalism nor libertarianism denies the social value of love. Each, at best, demands 
for the free choice of those to love. The liberal or libertarian demand for the free 
choice of who to love is a position  communitarians need not reject. In practice, it is 
impossible for every member of the community to exhibit the same degree of love to 
every other member. Members of a typical communitarian community are not 
expected to keep the same friends, marry the same husbands or wives, eat from the 
same plate and share clothes. If this is granted, then it follows that even a 
communitarian community would allow members the freedom to choose who to love. 
 
If the last point is accepted, in such a community the freedom to choose would be 
primary while love would be a secondary value. So Gyekye’s attempt to recognize 
rights is not absolutely new. Thus the primacy of love is a liability for Gyekye’s 
moderate communitarian proposal which aims at the recognition of the individual’s 
capacity for choice. The claim that love rather than justice is the first virtue of social 
institutions jeopardizes the effort of treating the individual and the community with 
equal respect. Gyekye’s insistence on the primacy of love therefore confirms his 
unrestricted communitarian orientation, as it agrees with the old or unrestricted 
communitarian primacy thesis which emphasizes the moral supremacy of the 
community. 
 
As a matter of fact, love and justice are not mutually exclusive. They could 
simultaneously be the first virtues of social institutions. After all, it is quite possible 
for two pupils to come first in a school examination. Again, respecting someone’s 
right to choose his/her friends could be one of the ways to demonstrate our love 
towards him/her. 





Is Professor Gyekye a moderate communitarian or simply a communitarian? This 
article has contended that his arguments in defense of moderate (restricted) 
communitarianism inadvertently support unrestricted communitarianism. This 
becomes evident on the basis of several considerations. 
 
First, both moderate and unrestricted communitarianism are based on the parent-child 
model. The child is, either partly or wholly, nurtured by the parents, and has certain 
responsibilities towards the parents that nurtured him or her. Similarly, having being 
partly nurtured by the community, the individual ought to perform his or her duties 
towards the community. We have argued that this position is not moderate but 
unrestricted communitarianism. 
 
Second, Gyekye, like unrestricted communitarians, stresses the primacy of love, 
which he considers to be the first virtue of social institutions. We have argued that this 
view jeopardizes the moderate communitarian attempt to balance individual rights and 
social responsibilities. A project that sets out to treat the individual and the 
community equally cannot justifiably prioritize either one of them. Besides, the fact 
that the primacy of love could be used by both the moderate and unrestricted 
communitarians undermines the strength of the arguments in support of moderate 
communitarianism. What is more, the priority of love over justice is superfluous since 
they are not mutually exclusive. The equal treatment of love and justice would have 
strengthened Gyekye’s arguments for moderate communitarianism than the point he 
makes about the priority of love over justice. 
 
Third, although Gyekye recognizes the individual’s rights, this recognition is for the 
sake of the community rather than the individual. Thus both Gyekye’s moderate 
communitarianism and unrestricted communitarianism grant individual rights the 
same degree of recognition. 
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In the light of the foregoing discussion, we conclude that Gyekye is a communitarian, 
not a moderate communitarian as he claims to be. His acceptance of the 
communitarian primacy thesis is contrary to the moderate communitarian attempt to 
balance individual rights and social responsibilities. Besides, contrary to Gyekye’s 
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